Every book or article written about USS Ranger, CV-4, mentions the obligatory fact that it was the first USN carrier designed and built as a carrier from the keel up. Many, but not all, point out that she was a product of doubt – of the belief that it was not wise to have so much of the fleet’s air power in giant hulls as represented by USS Lexington CV-2 and USS Saratoga CV-3. Spreading air power across more decks seemed prudent. Yet even as Ranger was building there were factions in the Bureau of Aeronautics (BuAer), led by its chief Rear Admiral William Moffett, that saw her as a competitor for funds with a project that would result in many more decks for the ‘Scouting Fleet’, the CF or ‘Flight Deck Cruiser’. And at the same time, the General Board, tasked with making recommendations for new construction to the Secretary of the Navy, had become convinced that no effective fleet carrier could be designed and built that did not displace at least 20,000 tons. (1) And as seen in Part 11, at the very time period when Ranger was authorized and built, BuAer and its chief were trying to determine how to best utilize the new giant airships that had just entered the fleet. Thus Ranger was born as, to use the British expression, ‘a one-off’ or an orphan. When World War II arrived for the United States, only seven years after the Ranger was commissioned, it was acknowledged by the upper echelons of the USN that her the role for which she was originally designed.best use was as an ‘aircraft ferry’ and she was used in that role often from 1942 to 1944. But it was not the role she was designed for.

The Washington Naval Treaty of February, 1921 gave the world a 10-year ‘Battleship Holiday’ and the frantic pace of warship construction, begun really in 1898 when Germany announced it would ‘seize the trident’ and build a High Seas Fleet, was temporarily ended with this Treaty. Many ships were scrapped (2) and some shipyards went under; those that survived did well as prosperity returned by 1922 and civilian construction took the place of much of the former naval work. Destroyers and cruisers, having relatively shorter service lives than capital ships, needed to be replaced on a fairly regular basis so some naval business continued; and much the same was true for auxiliary ships. No new capital ships (defined as battleships and battle cruisers) for at least ten years, and there could be no capital ship replaced until it was at least 20 years old. The only new, large, warship construction allowed by the treaty was in the new category of ‘aircraft carriers’, ships from 10,000 up to 23,000 tons maximum (the exceptions have been noted in previous articles) having no more than ten 8” guns. And each of the fleets had restrictions in terms of total tonnage of carriers. Given the limited abilities of aircraft in 1921, the total allowed appear generous but to many involved with the Treaty, carriers were simply cruisers that carried very expendable planes – no one in 1921 considered an aircraft carrier to be a new type of ‘capital ship’ so there was never a thought of a ‘Carrier Holiday’. The British, as we have seen, ended up converting large cruisers (Furious, Courageous, Glorious) to effectively use up their tonnage allowance, leaving little room, even if they could afford it, for new construction. The conversions of Akagi and Kaga left very little room for an effective new construction ship for the Japanese. Their almost complete re-building of Akagi and Kaga in the mid-1930’s made sense for them and we will see in the next article how they attempted to get around Treaty limitations.

The Americans, with a nominal 69,000 tons allowed for new construction (3) had to decide how best to utilize what was allowed. The options available – as Lexington and Saratoga were being converted – were three ships of 23,000 tons or five ships of 13,800 tons. Not knowing at the time how effective carrier air power might be (the only guidance coming from War Games played at the Naval War College (4)), the General Board in 1927 recommended a program of construction of five new carriers, each of 13,800 tons, to be built one per year from 1929 to 1933 (5). This plan was approved by President Coolidge Dec.31,1927, but by the time Congress was finished , only one carrier had been approved by February 13, 1929, with the proviso that it would not cost more than $19 million.(6) In December 1929 the plans were approved and detail design work began, only to be halted by Presidential Order until an updated naval treaty (London Naval Treaty) was signed. This occurred in July 1930. (7) Bids for construction were submitted in September, 1930 but all bids were too high. A sixty day extension was requested and in November the contract was given to Newport News Shipbuilding and Drydock Company. (8) The name ‘Ranger’ was assigned on December 10, 1930; the keel laid September 26, 1931; and the ship launched in April, 1933. (picture 1 above, and 2) Commissioning occurred in June, 1934. (9) Admiral Moffett, (picture 3) who championed small carriers as cost-effective (more aircraft embarked per 1000 tons of ship on a small carrier than a large one) and who had suggested that small carriers would be useful for reconnaissance and anti-submarine work (10) rather than being used to launch attacks on an enemy’s fleet, did not live to see the outcome of his ideas. His loss (11) would also impact the fortunes of the ‘flight deck cruiser’ concept to be discussed later in this article.

The design for CV-4 began to be considered the moment that the decision was taken in 1922 to convert two battle cruisers into carriers. At that time the U.S. Navy had no experience with aircraft carriers, the USS Langley CV-1 having just entered service that year and air operations did not begin until the late fall. Some design features were decided early – the new carrier would be a ‘flush-decker’ as suggested by pilots at the time, and have six smokestacks, three per side, that could fold down during air operations as did the ones on USS Langley (picture 4, above). The strength deck of the ship would be its main deck (floor of the hangar) and the flight deck would be built above it leaving the hangar ‘open’. (pictures 5 and 6) Underneath the flight deck would be a ‘gallery’ deck. Unlike Lexington and Saratoga neither bow nor stern would be enclosed and guns could be sited there. As many as 72-75 planes could be carried (pictures 7 and 8)and Ranger had a larger hangar than Lexington or Saratoga, measuring 552’ x 65’ (170m x 20m). (12) Long and narrow, 769’ x 80’ (236.6m x 24.6m), she had only a 19’ (6m) draught and her power plant could only generate enough power for 29kts.(picture 9) To squeeze all this into a 13,800 ton package a great flairing of the hull had to be adopted.(picture 10) Certain features, because of weight and space considerations, had to be omitted, thus Ranger had no room for torpedo storage and thus there would be no torpedo bombers in her air wing. (13) Her flight deck had pendants and crash barriers arranged for ‘double-ended’ operations – landing or taking off from either bow or stern – she was the first USN carrier so equipped. She was also the first aircraft carrier built with a cafeteria-style mess hall. (14) She had no armour protection but was equipped, originally, with eight 5” guns, two at the bow, two at the stern, and one on each quadrant. (picture 11) During her building design changes were made as operational experience with Langley, Lexington, and Saratoga began to be appreciated. Shops in the hangar deck were moved forward as vibrations toward the stern prevented precision work. With much effort and expense, a third elevator was added at the stern of the flight deck. (16) But the greatest design change was the addition of a small starboard island in 1932. By that date it was known that an island was an aid, rather than a handicap, for flight operations and would make ship navigation and fire control for gunnery simpler and more effective. (17) And in this condition Ranger was born and joined the fleet. (pictures 12 and 13)

Very shortly after work-ups, Ranger headed for the Pacific (Picture 14 above). She participated in Fleet Problem XVI, her aircraft doing very well in spotting and attacking submarines. It was discovered that the deck was too short for safe landings over the bow and that Ranger could only back up at a limited speed, but to extend the flight deck would destroy the usefulness of the bow to mount guns. Vice-Admiral Butler, Commander Aircraft, Battle Force, stated that Ranger had stood “her first test in Fleet manoeuvres very well, and I am satisfied that she will prove a very valuable ship to the fleet”. (18) Others, however, were less than satisfied and Butler did note, as well as praising her crew, that ‘under certain conditions of wind and sea’ Ranger’s pitch and roll were severe enough to hamper flight operations. This is evident in picture 15 below. Her fineness ratio (length to breadth) was almost 9 to 1 which is excellent for a racing scull but less than ideal when turning or facing long Pacific swells which made her pitch like a teeter-totter. (picture 16) She appears to have had many flight accidents, particularly when coming aboard: it seems that a good portion of Robert Cressman’s Ranger: the Navy’s First Flattop from Keel to Mast 1934-1946 is a description of every single landing accident during the ship’s career. She spent early January of 1936 off the coast of Alaska for cold weather flight operations testing but experienced no true sub-zero (-15C or colder) temperatures before the test period was over. (picture 17) In April she participated in Fleet Problem XVII and was the first carrier to have flight deck loudspeakers and to use yellow shirts (plane directors and spotters) and green shirts (arresting gear) for some of the flight deck crew. On October 6 she exhibited 8º of pitch which meant her landing ramp area was subject to an up and down motion of 20’ (6m). (19) The next February the ship was used for the film ‘Wings Over Honolulu’ and Captain Bellinger was given a role as Captain to the star’s ‘Admiral Furness’. (20) (Picture 18) And that was exactly his real-life role when Admiral Ernest J. King came aboard Ranger, using it as his flagship when he took command of White Force during Fleet Problem XVII in May, 1937. Tensions were thick as more than once Bellinger had to refuse ‘suggestions’ from King that aircraft be launched in weather Bellinger felt was too dangerous for flight operations. When aircraft were launched, Problem XVII set up scenarios that had Ranger exhibit sustained flight operations for extended periods of time – exhausting for pilots and crews – to defend the Battle Fleet or Main Body. (pictures 19 to 21) Being tied to the Main Body effectively negated the offensive power of the carrier and all but guaranteed that carriers would be lost if used this way. Others argued, however, that providing air cover to the Battle Fleet was vital and in combat worth the loss or two of a carrier. (21) Admiral King pronounced Ranger a ‘tender’ ship, a comment that referred both to seakeeping (it heeled noticeably in even a moderate turn – see picture 22) and to the fact that Ranger had no armour. One distinction accorded Ranger was that her gunnery units had the highest scores in competitions four years running, thus she was selected to be the first ship to practise against target drones. In these tests she hit nothing – the drones were expensive but the realistic training they provided were a spur to the USN to provide better anti-aircraft defenses for its ships. (22)

In January, 1939, Ranger transited the Panama Canal and in the Caribbean its air wing had the honour of ‘sinking’ the new carrier, USS Enterprise CV-6, during Fleet Problem XX, the last ever staged by the USN. She attended the New York World’s Fair in May and then took part from Sept.5, 1939 in ‘Neutrality Patrols’ as a new war in Europe began. Along with the newly-commissioned USS Wasp CV-7, she spent 1940 and 1941 involved in training and on patrols and was in the yards at Norfolk, Virginia, on Dec.7, 1941. One change made, out of many, was to give her provision for storing torpedoes, thus at the end of 1941 she had a squadron of TBD-1’s aboard. By this time Admiral Ernest King had been appointed as Chief of Naval Operations (note that he had been a pilot and not a member of the ‘Gun Club’) and he did not remember Ranger with fondness. He felt her best use was as an aircraft ferry, a role she undertook five times during the war. (23) (picture 23) When Wasp left the Atlantic to replace the sunken Lexington, Ranger was the only USN carrier in the Atlantic. The British, extended in the Mediterranean and having lost three fleet carriers, were always suggesting uses for Ranger and wanted her attached to the Royal Navy. King resisted the idea for as long as he could. Ranger did get into combat twice. The first time was as part of the joint naval force involved in Operation Torch, the invasion of North Africa in November, 1942. (picture 24) Her fliers did commendable work during the operation. The second was in October, 1943 when, as part of the British Home Fleet, she took part in action off the coast of Norway and her planes sank some German freighters.(picture 25)  She returned to Boston and the USN in December, 1943. All agreed that she would only be provided with a “limited overhaul….to fit her for training purposes”. (24) After a further ferry mission to North Africa, Ranger crossed to the Pacific and became the Pearl Harbour training carrier and in October 1944 she recorded her 50,000th landing; and had reached 75,000 by July 14,1945.(picture 26) At war’s end she went back across Panama and received a light overhaul in the Philadelphia Naval Shipyard. From March to August she was the training carrier at Pensacola (reaching 92,000 landings)but was relieved on August 29, 1946. Very quickly she was decommissioned (18 October), sold for scrap, and broken up by January, 1947.

Ranger, the first carrier ‘from the keel up’ in the USN, had only a 12-year lifespan. She, and Wasp CV-7, were the only ‘small’ fleet carriers (wartime conversions of the Cleveland and Baltimore class cruisers excepted) ever designed, built, and operated by the USN. Since 1948-49, there have always been voices protesting the ‘fixation’ or ‘addiction’ the USN has had for super-carriers and there have been scores of design studies undertaken to build smaller (and presumably less expensive) carriers – and the USN has consistently rejected them. One wonders to what extent the experience with Ranger, so long ago, has been a factor in these rejections.

Born of the same desire as created Ranger, to get more flight decks into the fleet and not have so much of naval aviation tied up with Lexington and Saratoga, the CLV (later changed to CF but both acronyms were used interchangeably (25)) was almost built: indeed, Congress in 1930 authorized $19 million for the construction of the first ship but although the money existed, the design did not. And by the time a design was ready, the full force of the Depression removed the funding (26), only to see the new Roosevelt Administration approve large-deck carriers and begin a naval build-up that removed the necessity for the compromises inherent in the hybrid cruiser-carrier design. And finally, the chief proponents or ‘boosters’ of the CF in the USN had died or retired by the time the money flow was restarted, thus the CF was never built.

One of the features of the London Naval Treaty of 1930 was a clause allowing up to 25% of allowed cruiser tonnage to have flight decks. A successful cruiser-carrier hybrid would provide as many as eight flight decks, given allowable tonnage, without counting against aircraft carrier tonnage. In 1925 the concept had been proposed but rejected by the General Board; now in 1930, urged by RADM Moffett, Congress provided funds for a prototype to be built. (27) Before detail design began, certain assumptions were understood. The proposed vessel would be 10,000 tons or less (Treaty size restriction for cruisers); would have armour to protect against 6” gunfire; would have high speed and long range; would have 9-6” guns and a secondary battery of 5”; and would carry 12 planes. War College gaming argued for 18 planes and protection against 8”shells. As part of the Scouting Force, these ships were expected to be involved in gunfights once the enemy’s scouting forces – cruisers and destroyers – were found. The aircraft decks of the CF would likely be damaged in a gunfight but with multiple decks in the Scouting Force, planes returning (and attrition rates for aircraft in the first encounter were expected to be 50%) would find an undamaged deck somewhere even if they couldn’t land on their own ship. The CF was considered expendable – once the enemy’s Battle Fleet had been found, their job was essentially over. (28) Not everyone in the Navy was in agreement with expendable cruisers, never mind expendable flight decks, and while this debate was ongoing, the Bureau of Construction and Repair (BuCon) Preliminary Design Department had its own struggle: “The entire design concept was replete with conflicts, and the specifications became a battle ground between BuAer, BuOrd, and BuShips.” (29)BuAer wanted a 400’ (120m) flight deck extended fully aft; two elevators; no island; hinged smoke stacks. BuOrd, responsible for gunnery, wanted all turrets to be able to train widely and would accept no compromise with the ship as a gun platform. BuShips, responsible for the hull and power plant wanted fixed funnels and engineering spaces to be armoured. BuAer, despite Moffett’s presence, lost the argument for two elevators and the inclusion of catapults; lost the argument for hinged funnels; but did manage to have all three main turrets located forward. The flight deck was angled slightly to port to allow a gun director to be placed on the starboard side ahead of the funnels. The flight deck was 350’ x 65’ (107m x 20m) and the hangar and flight deck could accommodate 24 aircraft (1930 size and likely some ‘tricing’ as seen in picture 27 in Ranger would be required.) but so much was squeezed into the hull that both engine and boiler rooms were located side by side and could be taken out by a single torpedo hit; and the avgas storage was not protected behind any armour. (30) (diagrams 28 and 29) By the time this final design was ready, the Hoover Administration had halted all construction and then the champions of the CF disappeared. Moffett, the ‘Father of Naval Aviation’, was killed in the crash of the airship USS Akron in April, 1933. Admiral William Pratt, so impressed with the actions of Cdr. Reeves in Saratoga during Fleet Problem IX, was replaced as Chief of Naval Operations in July. And RADM Harris Lansing, President of the War College, retired late that same year. Thus the field was left to the detractors of the CF concept and “Bull” Reeves was among these. (31) Hybrids would find their way into Japan’s fleet during WWII but none would ever be built for the USN. (32)

The picture (no.30) that heads up this paragraph is one of the most famous relating to Ranger and her aircraft. It has been made into a model/diorama quite often. Otherwise, the Ranger is only modestly represented in the modeling world. Neptun 1:1250 metal models has a model of the Ranger as she was in 1940 (Neptun 1315). There are no plastic kits of Ranger but Corsair Armada makes a 1:700 resin kit (picture 31) and Iron Ship Wright (ISW) makes a 1:350 resin kit.(pictures 32 and 33) These resin kits will produce a Ranger correct for the 1942-44 time period, but not for her time as a training carrier. The Floating Drydock has plans for Ranger in 1:192 scale and Taubman Plans has plans for Ranger in 1:96. As far as I could discover there are no card model plans for Ranger, nor are there any kits or plans, in any scale or medium, for CF, the projected hybrid cruiser-carrier. Pictures of the USS Ranger model found in the Museum of Naval Aviation in Pensacola, Florida, can be found on the Steel Navy website. I have only included one here (picture 34). This is an official U.S. Navy model and lacks the detail that one normally associates with model ships. Finally, pictures 35 and 36 show a very interesting model – it was a wooden kit that came out in 1935 (!), the year after Ranger was commissioned. It makes an interesting comparison to what is available today.

Additional Pictures: 37-41

Next: IJN Ryujo

1. The same General Board that in 1927 wanted to build five carriers of 13,800 tons each would, before Ranger's launch in 1933, opt for two 19,800 ton carriers.  Those became the Yorktown (CV-5) and  Enterprise (CV-6). Macdonald, S., “Carriers from the Keel Up” in Naval Aviation News, June, 1962, p.26

2. The British ‘lost’ the most by this Treaty. We live in an era when major warships have 30-45 year life spans and are shocked when units such as the USN’s nuclear-powered cruisers were taken out of service having served less than 20 years. But the original HMS Dreadnought, in service since 1906, was ‘second-line’ by 1912 and scrapped in 1920, and many of her sisters with even fewer years of service went to the breakers with her. Many Americans felt they had lost the most by the Treaty as most of the scrapping done of American ships involved relatively new construction or the scrapping of incomplete hulls.

3. Total allowable tonnage of 135,000 minus a nominal 33,000 tons each for Lexington CV-2 and Saratoga CV-3. CV-1 Langley was considered an experimental ship and so did not count against total allowable tonnage. For Japan, with 81,000 tons allowable, Akagi and Kaga ate up as much as the American giants, leaving only 15,000 tons available for new construction.

4. See Part 5: USS Langley for the first reference to the role played by the Naval War College in the early years of American naval aviation.

5. Preston, A., Aircraft Carriers, p.44

6. Pawlowski, G., Flat-Tops and Fledglings, p.41; Macdonald, op. cit., p.22

7. The original treaty had a clause obliging the signatories to meet every five years to work on revisions.

8. And thus began the association of this company (now a division of Northrop-Grumman) and aircraft carriers. This company has built all of the USN’s carriers since CVAN-65 USS Enterprise (as well as the super carriers CV-59 USS Forrestal and CV-61 USS Ranger).

9. www.globalsecurity.org “CV-4 Ranger”

10. A prescient idea but the ‘escort carrier’ would not arrive until 1940.

11. See Part 11: USS Akron and USS Macon

12. Preston, op. cit., p.45-46; Friedman, N., U.S.Aircraft Carriers: An Illustrated Design History, p.69

13. Friedman, op. cit., pp. 58-69

14. Cressman, R., Ranger: The Navy’s First Flattop from Keel to Mast 1934-46, pp8-9

15. This would be quickly changed as heavy seas made the bow mounts useless. Only light calibers would be carried at the bow and the eight 5” guns would be arrayed two on each quadrant.

16. www.globalsecurity.org “CV-4 Ranger” All fleet carriers in the USN would have three elevators until the Forrestal class (CV-59) was built with four.

17. Friedman, op. cit., p.72; also Preston, op. cit., pp.45-46; Pawlowski, op. cit., p.41; www.globalsecurity.org “CV-4 Ranger”

18. Cressman, op. cit., p.36

19. Ibid., p.62

20. Ibid., p.72

21. Ibid., p.84 As mentioned in earlier articles, this argument was never resolved by the USN. Its ‘Battleship Admirals’, often called ‘the Gun Club’, had not opposed naval aviation expansion in the 1920’s – after all, no battleships could be built thanks to the Washington Treaty – but in the 1930’s they were reluctant to allow carriers independent strike action. The issue was resolved by the Japanese who, by attacking Pearl Harbour, effectively eliminated the Battle Fleet and so the USN had to fight the Pacific War on the basis of Carrier Task Forces.

22. Ibid., pp.114-115

23. April, 1942: 68 P-40E’s flown off 100 miles from Accra, Gold Coast (today’s Nigeria)

June, 1942: 72 P-40F’s flown off 100 miles from Accra.

February, 1943: 75 P-40L’s delivered to North Africa

April, 1944: 76 P-38’s delivered to Casablanca

July, 1944: 90 aircraft ferried to Pearl Harbour

24. Captain Gordon Rowe: “It has been recognized repeatedly that this vessel has low stability, is weak structurally, and has virtually no protection against under-water attack.” Rear-Admiral Gerald Bogan: “A single torpedo hit would probably prove fatal” and because of her lack of longitudinal strength there was a “strong likelihood that a torpedo hit amidships would cause the vessel to break in two”. Cressman, op. cit., p.347 and p.351

25. Zinn, A., “The USN’s Flight Deck Cruiser” in Warship International, no.3,1979, p.233

26. www.globalsecurity.org “CF – Flight Deck Cruiser” The authorized funding was removed late in 1932

27. This would be part of the 1932 shipbuilding program: a second prototype was to be requested for 1933.

28. Zinn, op. cit., pp.221 and 231-232

29. Ibid., p.232. Bureau of Aeronatics; Bureau of Ordinance; Bureau of Ships

30. Ibid., pp.232-233; 235-237

31. Ibid., pp.242-243. Zimm concludes his article on the CF with a very interesting analysis of the failure of the U.S.N. system for scouting.

32. The ‘Independence-class carriers, CVL-22 to -30 were built on Cleveland class cruiser hulls and Wright CVL-48 and Saipan CVL-49 were built on Baltimore class hulls but these were pure carrier conversions and not hybrids.

Cressman, Robert, Ranger: The Navy’s First Flattop from Keel to Mast 1934-1946, Brassey’s Inc., 2003

Friedman, Norman, U.S. Aircraft Carriers: An Illustrated Design History, USNI Press, 1983

Macdonald, Scot, “Carriers from the Keel Up” in Naval Aviation News, June, 1962, pp.22-27

Pawlowski, Gareth L., Flat-Tops and Fledglings, Castle Books, 1971

Preston, Anthony, Aircraft Carriers, Galahad Books, 1979

www.globalsecurity.org ‘CF – Flight Deck Cruiser’

Zinn, Alan, D., "The USN's Flight Deck Cruiser" in Warship International, no.3, 1979, pp. 216-245

Main Picture: NARA (National Archives and Records Administration) NA 80-G-428440

Last Picture: NavSource (NS) 020431947

Picture 1: USN, public domain

Picture 2: NA 020433

Picture 3: USN, public domain

Picture 4: NS 02042

Picture 5: NS 020425

Picture 6: NS 020429

Picture 7: NS 020403

Picture 8: NA 80-CF-54862-6 found in Cressman, p.17

Picture 9: www.globalsecurity.org

Picture 10: NA-80-CF file found in Cressman, p.24

Picture 11: NA-CF-2114-2

Picture 12: USN, public domain

Picture 13: NS 020437

Picture 14: NA-80-G-391555 found in Cressman, p.118

Picture 15: NA-80-CF-3232-1 found in Cressman, p.112

Picture 16: NA-80-CFfile found in Cressman, p.75

Picture 17: NA-80-CF-5487-4 found in Cressman, p.49

Picture 18: NS 020428

Picture 19: NS 020440

Picture 20: USN, public domain, found in Pawlowski

Picture 21: USN, public domain, found in Pawlowski

Picture 22: NA-80-CF-21148-1A

Picture 23: NA-80-G-12974 found in Cressman, p.191

Picture 24: USN, public domain

Picture 25: USN, public domain

Picture 26: NA-80-G-230368 found in Cressman, p.361

Picture 27: USN, public domain, found in Friedman

Picture 28: USN, public domain, found in Zinn

Picture 29: www.globalsecurity.com

Picture 30: USN, public domain, found in Pawlowski

Picture 31: Corsair Armada 1:700 USS Ranger CV-4 box art

Picture 32: Completed Iron Ship Wright 1:350 USS Ranger CV-4 resin kit by Dave Judy

Picture 33: some of the parts of the ISW 1:350 USS Ranger CV-4

Picture 34: www.steelnavy.com

Picture 35: www.steelnavy.com

Picture 36: www.steenavy.com

Picture 37: NS 020405

Picture 38: NS 020402

Picture 39: NS 020407

Picture 40: NS 020413

Picture 41: NS 020434